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AI Agent Security: Are AI Agents Safe to Use?
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AI Agent Security: Are AI Agents Safe to Use?

Hidden instructions on web pages can hijack an AI agent, so here is what ChatGPT, Claude and 1Password do about it and seven rules for using one safely.

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AI agent security means keeping an AI that acts for you (clicking, buying, sending messages, signing in) from being tricked or from doing more than you asked. The biggest risk is prompt injection, where instructions hidden in a web page, email or file take over the agent, and OWASP, the security nonprofit, says it is "unclear if there are fool-proof methods of prevention."

The second risk is what OWASP calls excessive agency: an agent with more tools, permissions or freedom than the job needs. ChatGPT Work asks before payments and other hard-to-undo steps, Claude in Chrome won't make purchases at all, and with 1Password, Claude signs in without ever seeing your password. OpenAI and Anthropic both say their safeguards don't remove every risk, so agents suit low-stakes jobs best, with their access kept narrow. Five big US banks now say customers answer for what an outside agent does in their accounts, so approve every payment yourself.

Last checked November 21, 2026: OpenAI's help pages for ChatGPT Work and its cloud browser, Anthropic's Claude in Chrome safety and permissions pages, 1Password for Claude, and OWASP's guidance on prompt injection and excessive agency, all linked below.

What is AI agent security?

AI agent security is the set of protections that stop an AI agent from being hijacked, leaking your data or taking actions you didn't approve. A chatbot writes text back to you, while an agent uses tools: it opens websites, reads your email, fills in forms and clicks buttons, so a mistake becomes an action in one of your accounts.

Agents work through a job in a loop. They look at the goal, pick a step, use a tool and check what came back, then go round again (our explainer on how an agent works through a job walks through it). Each tool use is a moment where what the agent is allowed to touch decides how much can go wrong. An agent that can only read your inbox can leak what it reads, and one that can also send, buy or delete can act on a bad instruction.

You'll also see the topic called agentic AI security, and both names cover the same problem. OWASP's list of security risks for AI apps puts prompt injection first, as LLM01, and excessive agency is LLM06.

Are AI agents safe to use?

They are safe enough for low-stakes jobs if you keep the agent's access narrow and approve anything that spends money or can't be undone, and the companies that make them say some risk remains. OpenAI's cloud browser help page says its safeguards "do not eliminate every risk." Anthropic's Claude in Chrome page says the extension "is enhanced with our safety classifiers but is still risky."

Anthropic gives one number for how well its defenses hold. Its Claude in Chrome safety page says its current setup cut attack success to less than 0.08% in Anthropic's own testing, which combines known attack techniques, and adds that "the chances of an attack are still non-zero."

The safer agents share one design: you see what the agent plans to do and approve the risky parts. In Claude's classic side panel, for example, Claude shows the sites it will use and the steps it will take before it starts.

Claude's plan. Allow actions on these sites: yelp.com. Approach to follow: Search for best coffee shops in San Francisco on Yelp. Review the top results and summarize recommendations. Approve plan. Make changes. Claude will only use the sites listed. You'll be asked before accessing anything else.
Claude in Chrome's plan screen: one site, two steps, and an Approve plan button. Claude says it will ask before using any other site. Image: Anthropic's Claude in Chrome permissions guide.

Pat Simmons's review of OpenAI's Dots tested everyday jobs, and two of his notes show an agent's limits at work. Of handing it his Amazon shopping list, he wrote: "Amazon blocked its browser straight away. When I told it to build a way around the block, it refused, and fell back to Chrome on my computer." On booking a trip: "It stops at checkout, so paying is still my job."

Pat hasn't run a security test on any agent. His head-to-head of Grok Bot, Dots and Muse compares how they handled real jobs, if you're still deciding which AI agent to use.

What are the biggest agentic AI risks?

The two biggest are prompt injection, where hidden instructions take over the agent, and excessive agency, where the agent can do more than the job needs. Your passwords and your money are where either one does the most harm.

OWASP defines prompt injection as when prompts "alter the LLM's behavior or output in unintended ways," and says the instructions don't have to be visible to people, as long as the AI reads them. The kind that hits agents is indirect: the instructions arrive in outside content such as a website or a file.

Anthropic's example is a to-do list or email with invisible text telling Claude to "retrieve my bank statements and share them in this document." OpenAI's help page for its former ChatGPT agent described an agent planning a group dinner that finds a malicious comment telling it to fetch a password reset code from Gmail and send it to a malicious website. That page now says ChatGPT agent is no longer available and points to ChatGPT Work.

Excessive agency, in OWASP's guide, has three root causes: excessive functionality, excessive permissions and excessive autonomy. In plain terms, those are tools the agent doesn't need, access wider than the job, and acting without your OK.

OWASP's own example is an email assistant that only needed to read and summarize mail but was also able to send it. A booby-trapped incoming email tricks it into searching the inbox for sensitive information and forwarding it to the attacker. Read-only access, or making the user press send on every email, would have stopped it.

RiskWhat it looks like for youWhat protects youSource
Prompt injectionA web page, email or file holds hidden text telling the agent to do something you didn't ask, like sharing your filesClaude in Chrome's content and action checks, OpenAI's prompt-injection testing, and your approval on risky stepsOWASP LLM01, Anthropic, OpenAI
Excessive permissionsThe agent can send, delete or buy when the job only needed readingConnecting only the apps the job needs, read-only access where you can get itOWASP LLM06
The agent seeing your passwordsYou paste a password or code into the chat, where the AI can read itChatGPT's secure sign-in form, and 1Password filling the login so Claude never sees itOpenAI, Anthropic
Purchases you didn't approveThe agent buys the wrong item, or a hijacked agent buys somethingChatGPT Work asks before payments, Claude in Chrome can't make purchases, and Amex's Intent Intelligence once stores build it inOpenAI, Anthropic, American Express
Bank lossesAn outside agent with your bank login moves money, or the tool holding your login gets hackedKeeping your bank login to yourself, since five big US banks put those losses on the customerCiti, PNC, Citizens, JPMorgan, Bank of America terms

How ChatGPT, Claude and 1Password protect you

All three put you in front of the risky steps. ChatGPT Work and Claude in Chrome stop and ask before consequential actions, and 1Password keeps your password away from the agent entirely. For someone using an agent rather than building one, these built-in controls are the AI agent security tools on offer.

OpenAI logo ChatGPT Work's cloud browser

ChatGPT Work is OpenAI's agent for longer, multi-step jobs, and when it needs a website it uses a cloud browser on a separate computer. That browser keeps its own cookies and sign-ins, and it doesn't use your own browser's tabs, history, saved passwords or cookies. It's on paid ChatGPT plans, excluding Free and Go.

By default, ChatGPT asks your permission before it opens a new website. In Settings, under Cloud browser, you can pick Always ask, Auto approve (ChatGPT checks the address and only asks if it looks unsafe) or Always allow, which OpenAI marks "not recommended."

Separately, ChatGPT is designed to ask in the chat before any action that is hard to reverse or creates a financial, legal or account commitment, such as confirming a booking or making a payment. When a site needs a login, you type it into a secure sign-in form. OpenAI says a second AI model first checks the form for signs of phishing, and the username and password go to the remote browser without the model seeing them or ChatGPT storing them.

Anthropic logo Claude in Chrome

Claude in Chrome is a browser extension on Claude's paid plans (Pro, Max, Ultra, Team and Enterprise) that lets Claude read, click and type on websites. It has three permission modes. Manually approve asks before Claude acts, and Automatically approve, the default in the Cowork side panel, has Claude check each action for prompt injection and data theft and block anything unsafe. Skip all approvals turns those checks off, and Anthropic says to use it only "when you completely trust every action, connector, file, app, etc. involved in the task."

Whatever the mode, Claude asks before it changes permission settings, grants authorizations, types sensitive information into a site or permanently deletes anything. Anthropic's permissions guide also lists actions Claude in Chrome won't take at all, including making purchases or financial transactions, creating accounts, handling credit card or ID data, and following instructions from emails or web content. It asks before opening financial sites, and on Team and Enterprise plans, admins can limit Claude to an allowlist of sites or block specific ones.

1Password logo 1Password for Claude and for other agents

When Claude gets to a login page, it can ask 1Password for the login instead of asking you to type it. You approve each request with biometrics, and Anthropic's 1Password page says the password and any one-time code never enter Claude's context, memory or Anthropic's systems. Access lasts for the current task only. It's in beta on macOS, and it handles logins and one-time codes, while credit cards aren't supported.

1Password for Agents does the same for assistants such as Meta's Muse and Grok Bot: 1Password types the password into the page, so the agent never sees it. 1Password doesn't control what the agent does once it's signed in.

Sign in to linkedin.com. Secure credentials store. Muse needs a login. linkedin.com. Add to a Secure Store. 1Password
Meta's Muse asking for a LinkedIn login, with 1Password as one of the options for filling it. Image: 1Password.

Who pays when an AI agent gets it wrong

Often, you do. Citi, PNC and Citizens now say customers are responsible for what an outside AI agent does in their accounts, joining JPMorgan and Bank of America. Our report on how five big banks now put AI agent losses on customers lists each bank and what it changed.

Citi's terms go furthest: if an AI tool leaks your login or gets hacked, you're responsible for what the hackers do with your account. The banks also say they won't reverse a transaction an agent made, whether you meant it to happen or not. Citi exempts the AI agents it offers itself.

Card companies are building checks from the other side. American Express published Intent Intelligence, which records what you asked an agent to buy and checks the purchase against it before the charge goes on your card. You approve the request with Amex first, including the store, your maximum budget and the product details, and the agent pays with a stand-in card number tied to that one request. It only starts protecting purchases once agent and checkout companies build it in.

Confirm your intent. Carry-on Luggage. Budget: Under $400. Confirm with Passkey. Intent confirmed. Approve Purchase? Purchase Amount $350.00 USD. Approve. Decline. Purchase Complete. Depictions for illustrative purposes only. Features shown are under development and subject to change.
Amex's sample screens: you confirm what the agent may buy, then approve the $350 carry-on it found. Amex labels them illustrations of features still in development. Image: American Express.

Until checks like this are common, the agent's own approval step is your protection. ChatGPT Work asks in the chat before a payment, and Claude in Chrome won't make purchases at all.

Seven rules for using an AI agent safely

These turn OWASP's fixes for prompt injection and excessive agency into steps you can take, along with the advice on OpenAI's and Anthropic's safety pages.

1. Connect only what the job needs, and remove it afterwards

OWASP's first fix for excessive agency is giving an agent only the tools and permissions the task requires, so an agent that summarizes your email gets permission to read it and nothing more. Anthropic suggests starting with websites you trust. When the job is done, revoke site permissions in Claude's extension settings, or clear saved sign-ins in ChatGPT under Settings, Cloud browser, Cookies.

2. Keep approvals on for money, messages and deletions

OWASP's advice is a human approval step for high-impact actions. Anthropic says no defense is perfect and that for work with real consequences (money, messages sent as you, important files) you should stay close or switch back to Manually approve. In ChatGPT, leave Always allow off.

3. Never type a password or card number into the chat

OpenAI's rule is plain: "Never paste passwords, security codes, or payment details into the conversation." Use ChatGPT's secure sign-in form, or 1Password where your agent supports it.

4. Give a specific job with limits

OpenAI tells you to give clear instructions and say what result you want, and its former ChatGPT agent page warned against prompts like "Check my email and handle everything." Put the limits in the request itself, along these lines:

Find me a black rolling carry-on that fits in an overhead bin, under $400 including shipping. Before you buy anything, show me the exact item, the store and the total, and wait for me to say yes.

5. Keep agents off sensitive sites, or give them their own browser profile

Claude in Chrome takes screenshots of the tabs it works in, and whatever is visible becomes part of the conversation. Anthropic recommends not using it on sensitive sites and considering a separate browser profile with no access to sensitive accounts.

6. Stop the task when the agent acts strangely

Anthropic says that if Claude suddenly talks about unrelated topics, opens websites you didn't expect or asks for sensitive information, you should stop the task, because it could be a prompt injection attempt. OpenAI gives the same advice for when ChatGPT opens the wrong site or uses the wrong information.

7. Keep your bank login away from outside agents

Sharing your bank username and password is the step that moves the risk onto you under the new bank terms. A read-only connection, or a downloaded statement you upload yourself, lets an AI look at your spending without being able to move money.

Agentic AI in cybersecurity: agents as defenders

Security teams use AI agents too, and the strongest security models go to vetted defenders before anyone else. OpenAI expanded its Daybreak program in June and released GPT-5.5-Cyber to vetted "trusted defenders," a model built to trace a flaw, check it, write a patch, test it and hand a person the evidence, as our Daybreak coverage describes.

Google gave Gemini 4 Carbon to a small group of cybersecurity teams first, with no date for everyone else. Google says Carbon covers the defender's whole job: finding a weakness, checking whether it can be used in an attack and writing the fix.

Both companies limit access because a model that is good at finding and fixing flaws can also help attackers exploit them.

Questions people ask about AI agent security

Can an AI agent see my passwords?

It depends on how it signs in. ChatGPT's secure sign-in form sends your login to the cloud browser without the AI model seeing it, and 1Password for Claude fills the login so Claude never sees it. Anything you paste into the chat, the AI can read.

Can an AI agent buy things without asking me?

Not on the two covered here. Claude in Chrome won't make purchases or financial transactions, and ChatGPT Work is designed to ask for confirmation before a payment. Other agents set their own rules, so check before you connect a card.

Does an AI agent take screenshots of my screen?

Claude in Chrome takes screenshots of the tabs it works in. ChatGPT Work's cloud browser runs on a separate computer, and what it reads on websites is handled according to your ChatGPT data controls settings.

Is it safe to let an AI agent read my email?

Reading is the lower-risk part. OWASP's example of an attack is an email assistant that could also send mail and was tricked by an incoming message into forwarding private information, so give an email agent read-only access where you can, and approve every message it sends.

What are AI agent security tools?

For most people they are the controls built into the agent (approval modes, website permissions, a secure sign-in form) plus add-ons such as 1Password that keep passwords out of the agent's hands. For people who build agents, OWASP's pages on prompt injection and excessive agency list the fixes, such as least-privilege access and human approval for high-impact actions.

Sources

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